



Analysis of Alternatives: Deriving Warfighter Utility From Functional Measures of System-of-Systems Performance

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Workshop Issues

- Planning “optimum” tests
- Planning best mix of testing and modeling for evaluation
- Realistic “stimulation” of platforms under test
 - Methods of cost control in T&E
 - Economic models for T&E
 - Cost effectiveness comparisons of T&E facilities





Workshop Issues (cont)

None of these objectives has meaning without appropriate:

- **Measures-of-Performance (MoP), or**
- **Measures-of-Effectiveness (MoE), or**
- **Benefit, or**
- **other relevant value metric(s).**



Objective of Paper

- To present a kind of operational architecture suitable for integrated weapons analysis
- To see how the elements change as a mission progresses
- To see how the structure must be built from the desired mission outcome back towards platform design
- To extend the process to a system-of-systems



Key Metrics

There are three principal weapons platform metrics:

Level 4], *Platform Utility*, which is derived from

Level 3], *Platform Capability*, which is derived from

Level 2], *Platform Componentry/Connectivity*, which is the fundamental platform metric

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Key Platform Metrics

These metrics are the

WHY

(Level 4)

the

WHAT

(Level 3)

and the

HOW


(Level 2)

of an *operations research* framework.



Example: Platform Configuration

2]



Secondary Armament

Early Warning Sensors
(LWR, RWR, MWR)

Moving
Sensors
Communicate

Main Armament

Crew

Millimeter Wave Radar Antenna

Commo Equipment

Engine Compartment

Fuel

Ammo Compartment

Wheels/Track

Commo Equipment

Target Acquisition/Engagement Sights

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Abstraction: Platform Configuration

2]

Military Operations

Context

- Tactics
 - Doctrine
 - Scenario
 - etc.
- (Global Variables)

Level 2]



$v_2[C_1, C_2, \dots, C_c, C_d, \dots, C_i, C_k, \dots, C_m, C_n]$

Crew Ammo Fuel Msn Crit
Re-Armed and Re-Fueled


H + 7

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Testing for Platform Capabilities

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


Abstraction: Platform Capabilities

3]

v_3 [Top Speed, Max Range, Rough Terrain Capability, ...
Rate of Fire, Time to Acquire Tgt, Hit Probability, ...
Data Rate, Data Latency, ...]


Level 3]



$O_{2,3}$ Operator

Context
• Tactics
• Doctrine
• Scenario
• etc.
(Global Variables)

Level 2]




H + 7



Mission Utility from Capabilities

Effectiveness
SS? Performance
e? Lethality
Y?



4H



Survability
Y?
Loss/Exchang
Readine
SS?

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




Abstraction: Platform

Utility Level

4]



Level 4]




$O_{3,4}$ Operator

Msn Cap Reqs


Military Operations

- Tactics
 - Doctrine
 - Scenario
 - etc.
- (Global Variables)

H + 7



Level 2]



$O_{2,3}$ Operator


Context Data



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Physical Analogues for the O_{1,2} Operator






Abstraction: Platform Live-Fire Test Operator

Level 4]

Level 3]

Level 2]

Level 1]



$O_{3,4}$ Operator

Msn Cap Reqs

$O_{2,3}$ Operator

Context Data

$O_{1,2}$ Operator

Context Data

Risk Factors

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Military Operations

Context
• Tactics
• Doctrine
• Scenario
• etc.
(Global Variables)



Ablaze, the Arizona slips beneath the water



More US Marines won the Medal of Honor on Iwo Jima than in any other battle in US History.

In 36 days of fighting there were **25,851 US casualties** (1 in 3 were killed or wounded).

Virtually all 22,000 Japanese perished.

1 Level 4] - Mission Outcomes Status



Measure? Avoidance?





Loss Exchange Ratio (LER)

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Mission-Based Utility







Summary

- Have described an analysis framework that:
 - has three linked metrics - utility, capability, componentry
 - where utility is based on mission-related capabilities
 - capabilities are based on componentry
 - platform componentry is the fundamental metric, and
- Platform effectiveness can change over time as specific military
 - a] mission requirements change, and/or
 - b] the component infrastructure degrades/is reconstituted





Summary (cont)

- What you as testers can measure is:
 - a] the effect of the military environment (e.g. bullets, wear out, resupply) on platform component parts and
 - b] the performance (e.g. move, shoot, communicate) of the platform as a whole in the military environment.
- What you as testers cannot measure is platform military effectiveness, and must seek the warfighter input to infer:
 - a] how performance forms the basis for effectiveness and
 - b] what defines the military environment(s).



Summary (cont)

- Process also implies that you must begin by defining:
 - 1] what constitutes operational effectiveness, then
 - 2] the key supporting capabilities, and then
 - 3] the robustness of the key components which support these capabilities
- Process implies a clear division of labor between the Scientist/ Engineer and the Warfighter/Operator, and who has the appropriate knowledge for each piece of the process.
- The following paper by Mr. Sheehan describes a method for developing the relationship between platform performance and military effectiveness.



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Backups

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- P. H. Deitz and M. W. Starks, *The Generation, Use, and Misuse of 'PKs' in Vulnerability/Lethality Analyses*, **The Journal of Military Operations Research**, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1999.
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- R. Luman, *Upgrading Complex Systems of Systems: A CAIV Methodology for Warfare Area Requirements Allocation*, **66th Military Operations Research Society Symposium**, Working Group 26, 24 June 1998.
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Component Change Mechanisms

(Quasi-) Perm Damage

Ballistic
Chemical
Laser
Directed Energy
High-Pwr Laser
Nuclear
Physics of Failure
Logistics Burdens
(Fuel, Ammo)
Reliability
Fair Wear & Tear
Fatigue⁺
Heat Stress⁺

Temp Damage

Electronic Jamming
Cosite Interference

Comp Repair/Fi

Battle Damage
Resupply/Replenish
Sleep⁺

⁺ Personnel Related



Combined Platform Performance

ACQUIRE



COMM




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


System-of-Systems

Sys n




Sys $i = 1$





Top-Down Decompositional Framework





Bottom-Up Analysis Framework

Bottom-up process follows causal (*i.e.*, time-forward) behavior




Conclusions

- With an instantiated environment -



- Process



- Mission Utility → Platform Technology
- Applicable to “Systems-of-Systems” e.g. Communication Systems
- Provides structure for C/B, CAIV, and AoA analyses